The focus of this symposium is on strategic m atters. My task in this initial presentation deals with the ratios of power in the contem porary world. That word, power, occurs frequently in the discussion of international affairs. Its m eaning is not an obvious one, nor are the meanings of most of the other term s which predom inate in the discussion of international affairs obvious. I think it advisable, therefore, to clarify some of the basic term s pertinent to the topic.
The focus of this symposium is on strategic m atters. My task in this initial presentation deals with the ratios of power in the contem porary world. That word, power, occurs frequently in the discussion of international affairs. Its m eaning is not an obvious one, nor are the meanings of most of the other term s which predom inate in the discussion of international affairs obvious. I think it advisable, therefore, to clarify some of the basic term s pertinent to the topic.
War is definable as a contest of purpose between two sides consisting of groups which are states, or at least aspire to act like states. To the extent of exercising exclusive control over a segm ent of territory, the two sides dispose arm ed forces. They seek, each to its own advantage, to prevail in the contest of purpose by bringing about a radical redress in relative capa city and will for bringing force to bear. To that end they must actually transm it energy and discharge it destructively against each o ther's establishments.
From th at simple definition, we can derive many in ter acting dimensions which determ ine w hether wars are relatively larger or smaller. In this connection I wish to avoid the phrase lim ited war. It seems to me to be a misleading phrase. No war is infinite. All wars are limited. W hat is significant is the question of the respects in which a particular war is enlarged or constricted. How many participants are there? W hat pur poses are put at issue as war aims? How far do the antagonists go in generating energy and in producing organization and paraphernalia for transm itting such energy and expending it against the adversary with destructive effect -that is to say, to w hat level do they mobilize? How much energy is employed destructively? Over how wide an area? How intensively? How long is the effort persevered in? How great is the havoc wrought? These questions indicate the various interacting dimensions of war, and I should stress that the interactions, depending on particular circum stances, may be expansive or constrictive.
I take note also of various categories of w arfare encom passed by the definition I have given. Wars may be distinguish ed, one from another, with respect to the relation between the territorial bases and perim eters claimed by the contending sides. If they are m utually exclusive, the war concerned is unequivocally an international war. If they coincide, or if the territorial base asserted by one encompasses the base asserted by the other, the war is unequivocally an internal war. In parti cular cases, wars may be of mixed characteristics in this respect. The question of w hether a war is to be regarded as internal or international may express the central issue at stake between the contending sides. A nother point of distinction relates to the extent to which the antagonists are disposed or are able to conform to the usages generally followed by well developed states engaged in war. How explicit are their boundaries, es pecially in the consciousness of the inhabitants who dwell on one side or the other of the dem arcation lines? How far are their arm ed forces professionalized -th at is to say, dis tinguished by vocation and dress from the general public? To w hat extent do the antagonists have formal means of an nouncing policies and issuing edicts? With respect to such m atters as these, wars may be differentiated as conventional or unconventional.
I wish to proceed now to consider the m eaning of strategy and the cognate word strategic. As a point of convenience for clarification I ask you to take account of the m eaning of the word weapon. A weapon is an instrum ent used at the last stage of a perhaps complex series of stages involved in the process of generating and transm itting energy, and, finally, bringing it to bear destructively on an enemy establishm ent. That is to say, a weapon is an instrum ent used in the final stage of discharging force on a targ et in combat. When we focus n ar rowly on the junctures where weapons are used in w arfare, our perspective is tactical. When, in contrast, we adopt a perspective in which we seek to see the whole set of relations among the m aterial factors and between them and the myriad less con crete factors which bear upon war, our perspective is stra tegic. Strategy encompasses the great array of what I have called the interacting dimensions of war. W hat are the war aims? How do they relate to the question of who shall be drawn in as participants, and vice versa? How will these m atters affect the scope, intensity, and duration of the conflict? How, in reverse, will these m atters affect the issues put at stake? And so on, through a complex of inter-relations. These are the constituents of strategy, which encompass all of the military aspects of war but is by no means limited to them.
One more distinction between tactics and strategy is worth mentioning. Tactical considerations relate to combat. Strategic concepts are continuously active, w hether or not war is actually being engaged in. Every government must, to some extent, be continuously involved in the calculus of conceptual war, even at times when formal peace obtains. In his interesting small book called War in the Modern Age, Sir Keith Hancock stresses the understanding of war and peace as continuous processes unrem ittingly exacting attention, resources, and moral concern from those who govern. He tells us that they are not properly to be considered as successive and mutually exclusive segments of experience. He regards them as interactive and com plem entary endeavors which m ust be pursued in the life of states. How much of moral concern and of m aterial resources m ust be portioned to the uses of civil enjoym ent? How much m ust be diverted to those uses which are designed to intim idate and deter potential enemies and, as a corollary, to generate confidence in continuity within the state and to give reassurance to those abroad who are disposed to stand with it? Even under the conditions of peace, statesm anship involves an unrem itting appraisal of the potential for conflict and of its probable con sequences and an appraisal as well of the reciprocal estim ates made by putative friends and enemies over the great globe. These are the continuing constituents of any national strategy. Such strategy, if it is adequate, m ust continuously look to the generating and m aintenance of m aterial and moral factors to assure that such appraisals shall be made with self-confidence.
We come now again to the concept of power. That basic term refers to capacity to achieve intended results. In inter national affairs it takes on a strategic tone. It rings with impli cations relevant to capacity to intim idate putative enemies and to reassure potential friends. The constituents of power in international affairs do not pertain exclusively to a regim e's horizontal relationships with other regimes, nor do they pertain exclusively to relationships between a regim e and its internal base. Rather, the constituents of power encompass both frames. More to the point, the elem ents of power concern con tinuous interaction between the internal life of an organized society and the vast realm external to it. The relevant factors include such concrete m atters as resources, num bers, and geographic position. They include the aggregate of talents available within the population and such non-m aterial m atters as public spirit and general esprit among the people. Other constituents pertain to a regim e's reputation -its prestige, its capacity to elicit confidence in its given word, its will and its ability to enter into and to keep contracts. A central con sideration is always the integrity of the regim e's position in relation to the society over which it exerts jurisdiction. Is the regim e legitim ate? Is it such th at those who exercise authority do so in confidence of their right to do so and in confidence th at that right is acknowledged by determ ining num bers of those over whom they exercise jurisdiction? In contrast, is the regim e unsure of its title to authority and anxious about its tenure and its standing with its people? Those and such con siderations are integral to the quotients of power in interna tional affairs.
The elem ents of power are so basic to the life of states th at the term for the attribute is often applied to the entity; states are often called powers. Those considered to be capable of exerting influence widely beyond their own spans of ju ris diction are referred to as great powers, and great powers regarded as of prim e m agnitude are often called super powers. I urge that we apply caution in employing these terms. The role of a great power or a super power is not simply th at of exercising influence over a wide span. It is also that of being looked to expectantly and of continuously being pressed by others into the assumption of obligations on their behalf. It is so easy to infer th at the career of a great power is th at of pushing others this way or th at and to forget th at the role is also a good deal of being pulled this way and that by others. As a companion point, it is so easy to infer th at a so-called great power disposes illim itable efficacy and th at whatever may be unsatisfactory in the world situation is accordingly due to a default of policy on the p art of a great power. I urge upon you the thought th at even a so-called great power does not have power to ordain and to control affairs beyond the span of its own jurisdiction.
A year or so ago I spent a long evening discussing foreign policy with a highly select and manifestly capable group of young persons in my own country. At the outset they all agreed, when one of them uttered an aphorism about the need for the United States to eschew the role of a global policeman. My comment to them was that such an aphorism -an editoral w riter's phrase ra th e r than a policy m aker's phrase -never really settles any issue. As the evening progressed, however, the participants pressed a series of questions such as why the United States had perm itted the Greek colonels to overturn Greece's so-called democracy, why the United States had not headed off the 1967 war between Israel and its neighbors, and why the United States did not put its foot down and enforce a settlem ent of the Kashmir issue, race problems in Southern Africa, and so on. By tone and implication, the United States had complete foresight and untram m eled authority in world affairs. I pointed out to that audience that if the United States really had such omniscience and omnicompetence, then it would have no right not to be the world's policeman. I rem inded them of the simple and self evident circum stance that, for any government, including my own, foreign policy pertains to those m atters which by definition lie beyond the span of its ju ris diction.
Since coming to South Africa on this third visit, I have several times encountered sim ilar suppositions about American power in the world. Only a few weeks ago a South African reproachfully asked me why the United States had not long ago laid down the law with respect to affairs within China. Twenty years ago, he contended, the United States should have form ulated and given effect to a solution of the China problem, thereby avoiding a store of trouble for itself. I pointed to the vastness and complexity of the problem and to the modesty of American purchase on the situation. He retorted th at my country disposed illimitable power and that it would have achieved any result that it wished if only it had had a mind to do so. Ten m inutes further along in the discussion the focus was on Rhodesia. My friend asked me why the United States did not come to its senses regarding Rhodesia's autonomy. He added th at there was no possibility of bringing about a col lapse of the regim e there so long as it continued to enjoy South A frica's support. Taking my cue from w hat had been said about China, I retorted with a suggestion that the United States m ight issue South Africa a dem and for a change of front. In reto rt my friend expostulated th at South Africa was an inde pendent and autonomous country far beyond reach of American fiat. He abandoned all the prem ises he had invoked only a few m inutes before.
II. S hift an d p o larizatio n of p o w er re la tio n s Here, however, I am getting ahead of my account. I am discussing the ratios of power in the contem porary world with out having first examined the antecedent circumstances. Until very recently a basic circum stance in world affairs was the pre-eminence of Europe. It would be more accurate to say that certain countries or nations of Europe were ascendant in world affairs, for Europe is a general region ra th e r than being itself an actor on the world stage. T hat region, consisting of two compound peninsulas at the northw est extrem e of the great land mass of the eastern hem isphere along with the nearby British Isles, was the location from which radiated the energies and impulses by which the whole globe was drawn into one span of cognition in a great historic process beginning about five centuries ago. Conceivably, some other region might have been the hub of the great outw ard m ovement which encompas sed the globe, but in fact the hub was Europe. W here the American nation's Declaration of Independence asserts a claim to a "rightful station among the powers of the e a rth ", it ex presses a purpose to overthrow subordination and to enter into the scheme of diplomacy on a parity with the governm ents of Europe, where the powers of the earth were then located. Europe's heyday came in the century between Waterloo and Sarajevo. The nations then dom inant in world affairs drew upon a common fund of history. They shared a universe of discourse -meaning not m erely that they understood each o ther's languages, but also th at in a broad sense they shared a common view of the n ature of reality. The leading states of Europe were then roughly of the same m agnitude. Their govern m ents had come at last to accept a hands-off principle with respect to each o ther's internal affairs. The appeal of ideology was at a low point. That is to say, none of the world leaders was then trying to coerce any of the others into compliance with some purported universal scheme for the future. Their wars, fought for modest stakes, were relatively infrequent, brief, and not very destructive. Great Britain, exercising naval pre-emi nence from its offshore position, served as a balancing factor among the continental powers.
In retrospect, that period from Waterloo to Sarajevo -a period from which many of our assumed norms about world affairs, including our standards of diplomatic practice and the still enduring notion that peace and order are inherent con ditions in world relations and that violence and disorder are aberrant -seems almost idyllic. The process of disintegration, however, had begun toward the end of the nineteenth century and gathered momentum in the early phases of the twentieth. One distinguishing circumstance was the loosening of the bonds which had held together the m ultinational imperial states of Europe. Another circum stance related to the emergence of an integrated German state in central Europe. Its size was dis proportionate to the old European balance. Its power was enhanced by the dynamic development of ferrous industry in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Germany was dis posed to challenge Great B ritain's pre-eminence at sea in addition to seeking continental pre-eminence. The result was the precipitation of two general wars a generation apart.
From the perspective of the present we now understand the two World Wars as being two stages of one great historic process. In each instance the state of weapon technology had an aggravating effect. The wars set in motion proved to be beyond the capacity of the European powers themselves to bring to resolution. In his book, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe, A. J. P. Taylor emphasizes the im portance of the w inter of 1917 as the juncture when it was m anifested th at the European powers had become incapable of settling their issues among themselves. We can say th at for the next thirty yearsthat is from 1917 until the immediate sequel to World W ar II -the process of registering this circum stance dom inated world affairs. As of 1910 one would probably have counted eight m ajor powers in world affairs -five of them entirely within the compass of Europe and a sixth one, nam ely Russia, stretching from eastern Europe across the face of Asia. Forty years later the m ajor powers were reduced to two -namely Soviet Russia and the United States, the latter located entirely beyond the confines of Europe.
The shift in power relations over the world, brought about in so brief a period, was enormous. This polarization between two positions lying outside the form er center of pre-eminence in world affairs had been long foreseen. Baron Stein, a diplomat serving Catherine II of Russia in the late eighteenth century, was perhaps the first to predict it. Alexis de Toqueville, Hein rich Heine, and many others foresaw the developm ent in the early decades of the nineteenth century. How basic the change in circum stances has been for the United States! It can be indicated by one point of reference. In th at sum m er of 1914, when the various European governm ents were going through the fateful decisions and responses which would bring on the first of the World Wars, none of the governm ents concerned appears to have given a m om ent's thought to the question of the United S tate's possible role in the hostilities then im pending. Nothing indicative of awareness of the American potential, at least, has come to light from the diplomatic ar chives.
III. Other factors of change
How the United States has responsed to the demands of a pre-em inent role which has been th ru st upon it by cir cum stances is a story which I shall not recount in detail here. You well know the earlier hopes for achieving on a world wide scope, through the agency of a universal organization based on the principle of collective security, an order equi valent to th at which prevailed in the nineteenth century. You are aware how, in face of im m ediate disappointm ent of that hope in the sequel to World W ar II, the United States engaged its energies in fashioning an array of regional alliances in pursuance of which it has undertaken strategic commitments far and wide over the globe. It is relevant to cite at this point some of the concomitant circum stances differentiating the contem porary world from the situations obtaining in antece dent stages.
A circum stance which comes readily to mind concerns the erosion oj the imperial-colonial arrangements through which the form er great states of Europe exercised their autho rity over peoples of diverse cultures in positions far removed. Those inequalitarian arrangem ents have vanished wholesale. By dozens and dozens form er colonial areas have spun into independence and statehood. Many of them now participate in the public life of the world without having much of a public life of their own. They participate in the making of history on the world scene without having any relevant fund of history of their own to draw upon. As a result, busybody tendencies are encouraged among nations the world over. Governing ap paratuses which can scarcely give effect to policies within their own realm s are tem pted to dem onstrate their efficacy by meddling in m atters beyond their jurisdiction. States which have never experienced a free election of their own become the insistent exponents of free elections in lands thousands of miles away.
Another complicating factor relates to the intensification and acceleration of contemporary communications. In a poet's words:-
Gone are the days w hen madness was confined By seas and hills from spreading through mankind, W hen though a Nero fooled upon a string, Wisdom still reigned unruffled in Peking.
Americans m ight well envy the conditions obtaining in an earlier phase of the national career when Thomas Jefferson, our first Secretary of State, made note th at two years had passed since any communication had come in from our envoy in Madrid and that the m atter might require a looking-into if much more time should elapse in silence from that quarter. In our time the U.S. D epartm ent of State receives about three-quarters of a million words of electronic communication from abroad in each day of operations. No one mind can begin to m aster it all. Proliferation of inform ation is only one aspect of the problem. Even more im portant is the stimulation of artificial exigency. Statesm anship m ust contend everlastingly with the question w hether problems coming to the fore abroad are inherently urgent or are only m ade to appear urgent because of the speeding up of communications. Some problems in world affairs are inherently urgent. Questions of that sort may arise in our personal lives. When one hunts doves, for example, he m ust learn to respond to stimulus in a moment. If he asks a com m ittee to inquire and to report w hether the birds aloft really are doves, he will have missed his opportunity. In contrast, a question of what sort of life insurance to buy or w hat stocks to invest in is one to be answered with m ature deliberation. A person who is deliberate in face of questions requiring im pulsive answers and quick in coming up with answers to problems requiring deliberation is likely to get his life dis organized. So it is with governm ents which cannot distinguish between the truly urgent problem s and problems only seemingly so in world affairs. I have in mind the fatuous speed with which the governments, though lacking any real grasp of the situation, made up their minds on w hether and how to act in face of the so-called crisis in the Congo of eight years ago -a fallacious decision entered into with undue haste under the stim ulus of modern communications.
A third distinguishing circum stances, as Hannah A rendt says in her book, On Revolution, is the rampancy of political ideas which echo the French revolution of the eighteenth century. One of these, closely identified with secular rationalism , is the idea th at psychic fulfillm ent is to be achieved through mass political activity. We are supposed to find salvation in tem poral affairs. Our relationship to the state or to the collectivity is supposed to bring us spiritual regeneration. This is an age of faith -not of the faith th at moves mountains, but of the faith that mounts movements. According to a prem ise widely prevailing, all things are made feasible by capturing the center of political authority and issuing edicts for whatever may be desired. "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will be added unto you", is the way one form er political leader on the continent of Africa expressed the thought. One of the pro m inent activists in my country recently declared th at he was tired of the pursuit of happiness and th at it was up to the governm ent to capture it and turn it over to him bound.
A closely linked circum stance is the appeal of ideology. I mentioned th at term before. I said that ideology was at a low ebb in international affairs during the nineteenth cen tury. At th at time it was on the m argins of politics. In our time it is a central consideration. The ideological approach to general affairs has had a power base in international politics for more than a half century. By ideology I do not mean simply an array of strongly affirm ed political beliefs or preferences.
The term pertains to political purposes which purport to rest on a systematic intellectual basis. Ideological beliefs pur port to have universal validity. They purport to be an inter pretation of all history, to be predictive of an inevitable future, and to be exclusively valid for all humanity. Ideological beliefs are m aintained not as prudential possibilities but as certitudes of quasi-religious character. Ideologues are characterized by their claims to exclusive legitimacy. All differentiated pur poses and all interests which diverge from those m aintained by the ideological proponents are regarded not merely as rival preferences but as deviations from the very laws of reality. Despite all that has been said about the mellowing of ideology in recent years, we see today the proof of the continuing dogmatic th ru st of ideology in the events now being reported from Czechoslovakia.
Still another differentiating circumstance of great signifi cance is the contemporary dynam ism of technology. Alfred North W hitehead once observed th at the invention of invention was itself the greatest of all inventions. We see the significance of that observation if we interpret invention in a broad sense so as to include the tendency in contem porary life, especially within the most advanced societies, to contrive ever new methods of production and organization. The dynamic effects are given pointed emphasis in Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's new book, The American Challenge. I can only take time to recommend it to your attention. I can not take all the time that would be required to cover the enormous im portant implications of the book as it relates the way in which modern education has surpassed even the im portance of natural resources and the importance of the investm ent process as a factor in the momentum of developm ent of contem porary societies. The data which he adduces open up a prospect of an ever-widening gap between the rate of perform ance and the level of economic benefit of the most successful societies and those of the lag gard societies in the contem porary world. The gap between the successful and the less successful societies is all too likely to become wider and wider as the future unfolds.
IV. Technology of war and weaponry
I do not wish to dwell on these speculative considerations, however. I do wish to stress the effects of contem porary tech nology on weapons. As you know, the course of battle in World War I was largely determ ined by the advantage accruing to the tactical defensive as a resu lt of the state of weapon tech nology at th at time. In World W ar II the state of weapon technology shifted the advantage to the offensive. In the closing stage of that war the power of the offensive was pushed right through the top of the graph by the tapping of nuclear energy as a means of destructive power in war. Also in that war and since, there were prodigious developments in respect of lengthening the radius of attack. The consequence of these combined developm ents is to bring the whole world within the compass of one strategic theater. The prodigious weapons of our time are continuously ready for instant use. The nations with enough economic resources to be able to afford these new weapons systems are, so to speak, continually in a state of mobilization. The launching of an attack of enormous m agnitude against an adversary is an ever instant possibility. Yet it is a tra it of these weapons th at they cannot be used to fend off an attack. In this respect they differ vitally from the m ajor weapons systems of preceding epochs. Battleships and army divisions were susceptible of being used to defend one's own perim eter as well as for impinging upon an enem y's perim eter, but this is not the case with the prodigious weapons of our time. The concept of a deterrence -th at is, forefending against attack by having in place a retaliatory capability so great as to be able to destroy the enemy even if one's own establishm ent is destroyed first -carries strategic thought into a new dimension.
Along with their destructive potential, one m ust also take account of the strategic lim itations of the prodigious weapons. They have become so powerful th at they scarcely can be factored into any rational calculation for waging war. The only strategic mission th at can plausibly be assigned to them is that of countervailing and neutralizing sim ilar weapons disposed by an adversary. I emphasize this point. Several times since my arrival in South Africa I have been pressed with questions as to why the United States has not brought its nuclear weaponry to bear to achieve some policy objective or another. It is im portant to keep in mind the lim itations on the utility of nuclear weapon systems. It is necessary for the United States to m aintain them lest some determ ining advantage should ac crue to its adversaries, but th at negative purpose sums up the benefits.
Here again I should stress the dynamic effect of invention. According to a widely prevalent idea all processes have been accelerated in contem porary times. The idea is an exaggeration. To the contrary, some processes have been lengthened and retarded as a direct result of the speeding-up of others. The celerity characteristic of modern means of attack has a con com itant in the lengthening of the time required for producing a new system of weaponry. Invention becomes the m other of necessity. The leading m ilitary powers are pressed to move ahead with ever new weapon systems lest some determ inative advantage should accrue to the other side. The power to forge ahead in the technology of war has become a basic elem ent in strategic calculations.
* * *
With all these manifold changes, a longing for the realiza tion of a dependable order encompassing the globe -an upto-date and more enduring prototype of the order which charac terized the nineteenth century -persists widely. It is a spe culative question w hether such an order can be realized again within the calculable future. I take account of the many recurring predictions that mankind as a whole will soon succeed in relegating w arfare to the unhappy past and therew ith enter upon an unprecedented era of general peace. I see no em pirical evidence to sustain this high hope. I am not predicting th at the hope will be frustrated. I am simply disclaiming any reason for feeling assured of its success.
